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Post Construction Fire Safety Regulation in England: Shutting the Door Before the Horse has Bolted
A challenge in preventing fire disasters is that fires with severe consequences are rare. The history of fire safety has been to respond to such disasters through ‘stable door’ regulation, fixing the specific cause of the latest major disaster, but not necessarily addressing systemic failures in the broader fire safety system. This paper argues that a range of evidence exists that should be used in developing fire safety policy, and that reliance on annual statistics of deaths alone to guide policy may fail to address failings that can be inferred from other types of data. Qualitative data should not be ignored simply because they appear complex and subjective. Rather, consideration should be given to establishing a methodology for integrating the use of a range of evidence in fire safety policy governance. It is further suggested that UK post-construction fire safety regulation is inconsistent in a number of important ways, and that serious failings in fire safety are not being addressed by the existing regulatory mechanisms.
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Introduction
Fire disasters can wreak havoc on peoples’ lives. One of the challenges for preventing such disasters is that fires with severe consequences are (comparatively and thankfully) rare, and typically arise from a particular, hopefully unusual, chain of events. The history of fire safety has been to respond to such disasters through ‘stable door’ regulation, fixing the specific cause of the latest major disaster, but not necessarily addressing systemic failures in the broader fire safety system.
The problem at the heart of this dilemma is that society has historically relied on limited means of assessing fire safety performance. Typically, the main measure used is compilation of annual fire statistics, with a particular focus on deaths and injuries. This provides aggregate measures of fire safety performance across society and enables Governments to carry out cost-benefit analyses to decide which public safety risks deserve the most attention within a context of limited public resources. However, such reliance on historical, statistical data cannot realistically prevent fire disasters if the risks are ever changing due to innovations in architecture, materials, practice, guidance, and regulation. The fact that major fire disasters are rare does not mean that buildings are inherently safe from fire; it may rather mean that latent weaknesses can lie dormant for many years until a particular chain of events occurs. 
Historically low (and generally decreasing) levels of fire deaths and injuries in recent decades might seem to suggest that a major fire disaster is a statistical aberration, and that fire safety regulation in the UK is succeeding in delivering a societally tolerable level of fire safety (for simplicity we will focus on England​[1]​). It appears that, until recently, this has been the Government position with the view being that there is no obvious cost-benefit case to revise regulations when fire deaths are low compared to other types of deaths (IFSEC Global, 2011). However, fire disasters can produce a strong reaction to this type of argument; a system of regulation that was previously seen as working may subsequently be considered broken, as was concluded following the June 2017 Grenfell Tower fire (Hackitt, 2017). 
Two extremes thus appear to exist in developing fire safety policy. The standard mode of governance relies on outcomes, typically in the form of fire statistics, to guide policy. But when a major disaster occurs governance (temporarily) shifts to being driven by (understandable) public outcry. Long periods of complacency are thus interrupted by intermittent periods of intense and reactionary activity. The primary focus of this paper is to argue that other forms of evidence can help unpick the processes involved in regulation and highlight systematic weaknesses, thus providing a more rational and effective approach that avoids the historical oscillation between complacency on the one hand and ‘stable door’ regulation by disaster on the other.
We demonstrate this approach by examining the case of  post-construction fire safety regulation and our second aim is therefore to articulate how the failings in this aspect of fire safety regulation were ‘hiding in plain sight’ (Hansford et al, 2017), before the Grenfell Tower fire and subsequent Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety (chaired by Dame Judith Hackitt). This paper thus brings together three types of evidence to show that post-construction fire safety regulation was potentially allowing unsafe buildings despite the apparently favourable trend in overall fire statistics. First, qualitative data from 36 interviews with key actors (mostly carried out during 2014-15), along with documentary evidence, are used to describe widely perceived flaws in post-construction fire safety regulation. Quantitative statistics are then presented that suggest variable and inconsistent enforcement by fire authorities. Finally, a number of cases in which post-construction fire safety failings were discovered outwith the normal course of enforcement activities are highlighted.
We conclude by making some recommendations based both on our analysis of the failings of post-construction regulation, and on the value of our methodological approach to assessing the efficacy of regulation. Finally, as the final report of the Hackitt review was published during the revision of this paper, we provide a post-script that addresses the extent to which Hackitt differs from or corroborates our findings and methodological approach. 
The Fire Safety Regulatory Framework
Fire safety regulation of buildings in England is administered in two distinct phases. Building regulations deal with the design and pre-completion stages (including the construction phase​[2]​), while post-construction regulations cover building use and occupation. Building regulations were first unified nationally in the 1960s, with building approval based around prescriptive requirements that were imposed mostly according to a building’s size and usage. Thatcherite deregulation then led to major changes in approach in the mid-1980s, with the introduction of ‘functional requirements’.​[3]​ Prescriptive guidance was retained as an option in the form of the Approved Documents (e.g. Approved Document B for fire (MHCLG, 2013)), but alternative methods could be used so long as the functional requirements of the statutory building regulations were satisfied. This alternative approach is typically (though imprecisely) referred to as ‘performance based design’ (PBD). Separate post-construction regulation covers the occupancy of most buildings (other than single-family homes).​[4]​ The current regulations were introduced in 2006 in the form of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (hereafter referred to as the RRFSO) (RRFSO, 2005)​[5]​. The logic was to consolidate what was a fragmented system (with the Fire Precautions Act 1971, the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987, and the Licensing Act 2003 all in operation), and to reduce the perceived burden of regulation on businesses (BRTF, 2003). 
The RRFSO shifted the main regulatory responsibility away from the Fire and Rescue Services (FRS). Buildings were previously regulated (in most cases) under the Fire Precautions Act 1971; this required relevant premises to obtain a fire certificate from the local FRS. Applicable buildings would be inspected, and a fire risk assessment carried out by the local FRS before issuing the fire certificate.
The RRFSO shifted the onus of post-construction fire safety regulation onto the building’s ‘responsible person’​[6]​ for most buildings.​[7]​ Where a workplace is concerned, the responsible person is the employer ‘if the workplace is to any extent under his control’; otherwise, it is ‘the person who has control of the premises’ (RRFSO, 2005, s.3). The responsible person must take ‘such general precautions as will ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the safety of any of his employees’ and ‘in relation to relevant persons who are not his employees, take such general fire precautions as may reasonably be required in the circumstances of the case to ensure that the premises are safe’ (RRFSO, 2005, s.8). The responsible person must also carry out a fire risk assessment so as to ‘make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks to which relevant persons are exposed for the purpose of identifying the general fire precautions’ (RRFSO, 2005, s.9).
The Fire Risk Assessment
Because most premises are no longer inspected by the FRS, the quality of the fire risk assessment is crucial to the effectiveness of what amounts to self-regulation of post-construction fire safety. The legislation requires that the fire risk assessment should be ‘suitable and sufficient’ but does not define what this means in practice.​[8]​ Whether a risk assessment is ‘suitable and sufficient’ ultimately depends on the judgment of a court, but in practice the FRS will seek to impose a view (see below) if and when they encounter cases that they consider do not meet this standard.
The apparent vagueness of this requirement mirrors the use of the phrase ‘suitable and sufficient’ in health and safety legislation. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2013, p.27) offer guidance to inform the court on its meaning. An important modifier to the definition is the principle of reasonable practicability that allows fire risk assessors to balance the cost of controlling the risk in terms of money, time, or inconvenience/loss of functionality, and the amount of risk that is being reduced.​[9]​  The concept is expressed in the phrase so far as is reasonably practicable (SFARP) used in the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.
The responsible person must ensure that the fire risk assessment is performed, but can delegate the task to an employee or an external contractor. However, '[n]o matter who carries out the fire risk assessment the duty holder retains the responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of that assessment’ (FRACC, 2014, p.3). Risk assessments must be reviewed and kept up to date if ‘there is reason to suspect it is no longer valid’ or ‘there has been a significant change in the matters to which it relates’ (RRFSO, 2005, s.9(3)(a) and (b).
For the self-regulation implicit in the RRFSO to be effective requires that the responsible person is aware that they have this legal role, and also what constitutes a ‘suitable and sufficient’ fire risk assessment for their premises, as well as whether any changes are so significant as to require the assessment to be reviewed. The responsible person can carry out the risk assessment if they have ‘enough training and experience or knowledge’ (DCLG, 2006, p.129), and guidance​[10]​ is available to assist in this regard for a range of building types. A responsible person who feels ‘unable to apply the guidance … should seek expert advice from a competent person’ (DCLG, 2006, p.4). 
Fire Risk Assessment and the Fire Safety Design
The RRFSO does not explicitly refer to the fire safety design that, in most buildings, would have been approved when the building was first constructed.​[11]​ However, the implication is that the fire safety design approved under the Building Regulations should remain functional and appropriate as the building ages. The fire risk assessment thus should account for how the fire safety design was intended to operate, check that suitable maintenance and training are in place, and assess whether it still addresses the current risks. 
Bullock and Monaghan (2014, p.32) have asked rhetorically: ‘When taking receipt of a completed building surely the occupier should request adequate documentation to show what was built? How, otherwise, would they know and be able to manage it properly?’ The main mechanism to enable this is ‘Regulation 38’ that requires that the ‘person carrying out the work shall give fire safety information to the responsible person not later than the date of completion of the work, or the date of occupation of the building or extension, whichever is the earlier’ (Building Regulations, 2010, s.38(2)). This fire safety information is particularly important if the fire safety design deviates from the prescriptive approach (e.g. Approved Document B (MHCLG, 2013)) because functional features of a non-prescriptive fire safety solution may be opaque to casual inspection. As one fire risk assessor put it: ‘I need to see that [fire safety information package] because, without it, I don’t know what the design vision is. It may only be a simple building, but I don’t even know whether the design is performance-based or whether it came from a prescriptive standard?’​[12]​
However, despite the significance of the fire safety information for carrying out fire risk assessments, there is no explicit reference to this information, or to Regulation 38, in the RRFSO. Interviews with stakeholders have highlighted two main flaws in this mechanism: (1) the required fire safety information is rarely used by the responsible person or their delegated fire risk assessor; and (2) even where the fire safety information is used, it may be of limited value because it is inadequate in some way and/or the responsible person is unable (or not sufficiently competent) to properly interpret it. 
Indeed, the requirement to transfer the information on the completion of the work may be impractical because the responsible person may not yet be in situ. Building Control (or an Approved Inspector​[13]​) simply require the project developer to confirm that they have provided the fire safety information without checking its contents or that it has actually reached the responsible person.
Thus, despite what Regulation 38 requires, it appears that the fire safety information provided by the design team rarely finds its way the responsible person, and there is no effective regulatory oversight to ensure transfer. The fire safety information may in some cases be left in the building on completion, but it is rarely used thereafter for fire risk assessment. As one fire risk assessor put it, ‘generally, you ask for that information, but you don’t get it. The people that you speak to, normally the building manager, they don’t have that information. I can’t ever recall a building manager that has said to me, “yes, this is the design for fire safety within this building”.’​[14]​ Another fire risk assessor commented ‘it is very, very, very rare that you actually go into a building and find that you’ve got the information about how the building is designed. In fact, in all honesty, I’ve been doing [fire risk assessment] for too many years, and I’ve never, ever seen it.’​[15]​ Yet another fire risk assessor commented, ‘we’ll park Regulation 38 for a minute because that, I think sometimes, is an urban myth.’​[16]​ Nor is it guaranteed that the information supplied under Regulation 38 will be accurate. BRE guidance on Regulation 38 (BRE, 2018) notes that when a building design is sufficiently complex to require the services of a fire safety consultant, the ensuing contract is usually fulfilled following the approval of the fire safety design by the pre-construction regulator. This may be some time before the building construction has reached completion, late changes to the building design often happen after the conclusion of the fire safety consultant’s contract and thus also following the documentation of the fire safety information.  This change to the building design may affect the validity of the already documented fire safety information, but with no fire safety specialist present during the later stages of construction to examine and verify this or to amend the documentation. Incorrect fire safety information may thus be transferred on building completion, meaning any post-construction fire risk assessment may be predicated on incorrect information.
More generally, even when the responsible person can find the fire safety information, it may not be in a form that is useful to them. Guidance is provided e.g. in Approved Document B (MHCLG, 2013, Appendix G), but there is no standardised format for providing this information, nor is there any requirement for the responsible person or a delegated fire risk assessor to have any particular level of competence to understand it. This can be a problem because ‘unless you’ve got someone that understands the theory and the practice of what has been documented, then the challenge of understanding those concepts and using them to manage the building effectively is quite high.’​[17]​
The requirement on Building Control is ‘to ensure that sufficient information is recorded to assist the eventual owner/occupier/employer to meet their statutory duties under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005’ (MHCLG, 2013, preface). This requirement does not include checking that the ‘information provided should include all fire safety design measures in appropriate detail and with sufficient accuracy to assist the Responsible Person to operate and maintain the building in reasonable safety’ (DCLG, 2007, p.24). The responsibility for this is given to ‘the person carrying out the work' (Building Regulations, 2010, Part 8, s.38(2)); this means that in practice there is no regulatory check on the quality or consistency of the fire safety information produced.
Fire Risk Assessors and Competency
The self-regulation ideology underlying UK post-construction fire safety hinges on the role of the responsible person in producing a ‘suitable and sufficient’ fire risk assessment and acting on it to incorporate risk control measures in an effective management system. Although the responsible person bears ultimate responsibility for carrying out a risk assessment and ensuring the provision of fire precautions, they can employ a specialist fire risk assessor to do this. Competence to do this is defined as having ‘sufficient training and experience or knowledge and other qualities to enable him properly to assist in undertaking the preventative and protective measures’ (RRFSO, 2005, s.18(5)).
To function effectively the RRFSO requires that the responsible person behaves in a way appropriate to the level of risk. Low risk premises will thus not be overly encumbered with unnecessary fire safety measures (nor the regulatory authorities with checking them). What counts as sufficient competence therefore depends on the level of risk in the premises. However, this presupposes that the level of risk can be properly assessed, resulting in a Catch 22 situation because it requires someone sufficiently competent to assess the risk in the first place and know what level of competence is required.
This points to a logical flaw with this form of self-regulation: a responsible person with little or no fire safety expertise cannot reasonably be expected to know the level of fire risk posed by their premises, and thus what constitutes an adequate fire risk assessment. In many cases, the responsible person will not themselves have the competence to carry out an adequate fire risk assessment. As one fire risk assessor put it, ‘asking a hotelier to do a fire risk assessment is like asking a fire officer to cook a six-course Cordon Bleu meal.’​[18]​
Fire risk assessment templates are widely available​[19]​ and usually follow a simple tick-box format alongside a list of questions. This simplicity may be misleading because considerable knowledge is necessary to answer many of the questions correctly. For example, one question might ask ‘is there a fire alarm system installed in the building?’ To be followed by a second question: ‘is the fire alarm system adequate?’ Answering yes to the first question is easy, if indeed there is a fire alarm system present. However, only those with appropriate technical knowledge and fire strategy insight can provide a useful answer to the second question.
The more complex and risky a building is, the more it matters that the fire risk assessor has sufficient competency. However, ‘there are no statutory registration or accreditation requirements’ (Hackitt, 2017, p.17). In England, anyone can call themselves a fire risk assessor and operate as such. Some assurance of competence can be gained by using a fire risk assessor who is registered or accredited with a fire risk assessor registration organisation. As one university fire safety advisor put it, in this manner ‘you’re not going to get any cowboys applying.’​[20]​
Two approaches are seen as providing assurance of competence for fire risk assessors: (1) registration to a professional body such as the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE)​[21]​; and (2) third-party certification by a certification body that is accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS). As an article in the May 2016 International Fire Professional journal (Todd, 2016) put it: ‘There is a gradual recognition of the value of registration and certification schemes for fire risk assessors.’ The article also states that: ‘use of third party certified persons and companies not only provides reassurance to those in need of suitable and sufficient fire risk assessments, but the use of these fire risk assessors may, one day, assist in establishing a defence of due diligence if things go badly wrong.’ However, while this may show due diligence (and indemnify against legal action), it may not necessarily guarantee that the fire risk assessor is competent for the particular job in question. 
A concern with the registration or accreditation schemes is that the organisations involved may not provide a consistent level of quality control, may lack mechanisms for addressing poor performance, and may be financially motivated. Thus, one fire risk assessor said, ‘I tend to see them more as money-making concerns rather than as certificates of competence.’​[22]​ One fire safety enforcement officer, concerned with the competence of the fire risk assessment he encountered during a fire safety audit, noted that the fire risk assessor was a member of one of the registration organisations. He approached the organisation to challenge the competency of their registered member but was told that no procedure was in place to do this.​[23]​ In this case the inadequate fire risk assessment was dealt with by enforcing the regulations.
Regulatory Enforcement Data
Our second form of evidence is FRS data that details their enforcement activities.​[24]​ These enforcement activities are determined by local risk-based analysis using an integrated risk management plan (IRMP) which is produced by the local FRS in accordance with guidance provided by the Chief Fire Officer’s Association (CFOA).​[25]​
This risk-based approach is intended to ensure that premises considered most at risk are checked at appropriate intervals. Each FRS has discretion to set its own policy, as made explicit in its integrated risk management plan (DCLG, 2008; Fire and Rescue Services Act, 2004, Part 3, s.21). FRS are permitted to carry out audits, issue enforcement notices, and prohibit the use of premises whenever they deem it necessary.




Figure 1. The average percentage of premises audited between 2010 and 2016 in Family Group 4. Numbers above bars indicate total number of audits performed (NFCC, n.d.).

Lancashire FRS has been the most active authority in terms of carrying out fire safety audits during the six-year period, while Hampshire has been the least active. Figure 1 also indicates that only a small percentage of the total number of auditable premises have been audited in any of the jurisdictions in Family Group 4. The enforcement policy of each FRS sets out how this small percentage of premises is identified. For example, Lancashire FRS target their inspection programme ‘at high risk buildings and where fire safety management is known or suspected to be poor’ (LFRS, 2013, p.15), whereas Hampshire FRS target premises most at risk ‘according to seasonal and demographic changes’ (HFRS, 2007, p.2).
As well as clear differences in the number of audits carried out, large differences in their outcomes also exist. Figure 2 shows the number of audits considered to be satisfactory, highlighting considerable variability in enforcement outcomes. Of perhaps greater concern in Figure 2 is that the majority of FRS in Family Group 4 apparently experience more than 50% unsatisfactory audits.

Figure 2. The average percentage of unsatisfactory audits in Family Group 4 between 2010 and 2016. Numbers above bars indicate total number of audits performed (NFCC, n.d.).

Figure 3 shows the percentages of premises that were initially deemed unsatisfactory but were later found to be satisfactory following enforcement activity. This again indicates wide disparities between members of Family Group 4. In theory, an unsatisfactory audit of a premises should lead to activity intended to raise the standard of fire safety in the premises. The authority would then monitor this work until a satisfactory standard has been achieved, as judged by a satisfactory result in a subsequent fire safety audit.
Figure 3 suggests that Leicestershire FRS come close to meeting this expectation. However, more than half of the FRS in Family Group 4 achieve less than 50% in this respect. Based on these data, many FRS appear to be in a situation where relatively few unsatisfactory premises are effectively addressed by this process.

Figure 3. The average percentage of audits that became satisfactory following enforcement activity between 2010 and 2016 in Family Group 4. Numbers above bars indicate number of unsatisfactory first fire safety audits (NFCC, n.d.).
Enforcement Case Studies
An impression of inconsistent oversight is also evident in our third form of evidence, which comprises cases of regulatory breaches that were only uncovered by serendipity. No claims are made here as to the statistical significance of these cases; simply that they provide compelling evidence that numerous instances exist where the self-regulatory role of the responsible person is not achieving the desired outcomes.
Failures in the management of fire safety in premises can come to the attention of enforcing authorities in various ways: (1) the occurrence of a fire bringing to light obvious or potential breaches of regulation; (2) an allegation of regulatory breach in a premises by a member of staff or a member of the public contacting the enforcing authority; or (3) a regulatory breach suspected by an enforcement officer from a different agency. 
Various examples exist of serious regulatory breaches being spotted when FRS personnel were attending a fire incident. At Lakanal House (BBC, 2013) the self-regulation approach of the RRFSO had failed at the first hurdle because a fire risk assessment had apparently not even been carried out. At Shell Centre Building (Appleby and Smail, 2012) a failure to keep the fire risk assessment up-to-date with changes in the building or its use became evident. In other cases, the fire risk assessment had been carried out by someone lacking sufficient competence (Appleby and Smail, 2012; Cox, 2011), or had not been appropriately acted upon (IFSEC Global, 2016). In the case of the Bowland Lodge care home (TWFRS, 2011) multiple failings existed, with an out-of-date fire risk assessment that had also not been properly acted upon. Potential breaches of the RRFSO at the Morven House care home (IFSEC Global, 2016) were reported by an officer of the Care Quality Commission following a visit.
Some of these cases involved serious fires with loss of life where subsequent investigation highlighted failings in the operation of the regulations. However, more generally these cases suggest that failings are widespread but at present are typically only discovered serendipitously and/or after a fire with serious consequences.
Conclusions
This paper makes two overarching arguments. First, it is argued that a range of evidence exists that should be used in developing fire safety policy. This methodological argument is demonstrated by using three forms of evidence (other than fire casualty and damage outcomes) to highlight potential inadequacies in England’s system of post-construction fire safety regulation, our second main claim thus being that enough was known (or was knowable) before the Grenfell Tower fire brought this issue to public scrutiny; our evidence entirely predates Grenfell.
Our methodological argument centres on the problem that reliance on annual statistics of deaths and damage alone to guide policy may fail to address failings that can be inferred from other types of data. In particular, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that it is a mistake to think that those things that can be readily quantified and measured are the only things that must be considered (Porter, 1996). Reliance on historical statistics alone is an inadequate guide to policy in this area, particularly as fire disasters are prone to cause ‘blips’ in the historical record. Qualitative data should not be ignored simply because they appear complex and subjective.
For a fire to ignite, grow, spread, and cause multiple casualties typically requires the coincidence of a number of things going wrong. Weaknesses in a building’s fire safety design may thus lie dormant for many years, and if only assessed by fire casualty outcomes the building’s performance may appear satisfactory. This means that the traditional ‘stable door’ approach to fire safety regulation is clearly problematic because only major disasters are likely to lead to change. However, analysis of the other types of evidence collected pre-Grenfell and presented here shows that it is possible to identify issues of concern without needing a disaster to occur, provided that policy-makers are willing to listen and, more importantly, act. 
Our first set of recommendations thus concern the need to establish a methodology for integrating the use of a range of evidence in fire safety policy governance. To avoid complacency the relevant Government department should be required to carry out an annual fire safety review that not only encompasses analysis of a range of outcomes other than simply casualty statistics, but also requires in-depth analysis of the processes involved in any areas of concern. Consideration should also be given to establishing an international forum for consolidating and exchanging data and analysis of fire risks, and initiating research on the potential use of new forms of data (not just ‘big data’) for this purpose. 
Second, a specific claim is made with regard to post-construction fire safety regulation. The analysis presented suggests that UK post-construction fire safety regulation is inconsistent in a number of ways. The regulatory authorities (the fire and rescue authorities) provide oversight that appears to vary markedly between different regions, and the value of this oversight is heavily dependent on the way that individual services decide which premises to investigate. This limited regulatory oversight (typically only for ‘high risk’ premises) means that most building occupiers need not prioritise fire safety. For many premises in England and Wales, the only fire safety regulation that occurs during a building’s operational lifetime now consists of self-regulation via the RRFSO and its mechanism of the fire risk assessment. Even well-intentioned businesses may thus become complacent about the risk of fire when faced with more immediate day-to-day concerns, whereas the more unscrupulous may completely ignore some of the basic tenets of fire safety. 
Evidence from interviews and case studies suggests that serious failings in fire safety are not being addressed by this mechanism. It seems clear that the lack of enforcement means that the role of responsible person is not carried out as intended for many premises (with fire risk assessments either not being carried out, or not being updated when necessary, or being inadequate in nature). Moreover, in many cases fire risk assessments are carried out without access to the fire safety information that is intended (under ‘Regulation 38’) to describe the building’s original fire safety design, strategy, and systems; and possibly by people who lack the appropriate competence. At present no qualifications are necessary to practise as a fire risk assessor in the UK, and the competence of fire risk assessors is not regulated by Government. To the extent that it is informally regulated at all, this is dependent on self-policing by the fire safety industry and the research presented herein suggests that this self-policing may not be operating effectively.
Three particular recommendations flow from this analysis. First, given the importance of the fire safety design information for ongoing maintenance and fire risk assessment, a better system is needed to ensure that it has been transferred, and that it is maintained and updated as appropriate. One potential solution could be that buildings should have ‘passports’ containing all relevant information, held on a public register, and available to the building user.
Second, if a system based on self-regulation is to continue then greater oversight of the fire risk assessment process is desirable. All relevant premises could be required to submit their assessments to their local Fire & Rescue Service (FRS), and these Authorities would then need to have consistent approaches (and resources) for checking these assessments, for carrying out on-site audits, and for remedying deficiencies. 
Finally, our third recommendation for improving post-construction regulation is that an obligatory registration process for fire risk assessors (perhaps administered in a similar manner to the Gas Safe Register currently in place for gas engineers) should be established. This would establish a legal framework to ensure that fire risk assessors have appropriate qualifications.

Postscript: The Hackitt Review
Our research was carried out before the establishment of the Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety (chaired by Dame Judith Hackitt) that was set up after the Grenfell Tower fire, and which issued its final report in May 2018. The Hackitt review provided a broad analysis of regulatory failings with regard to the safety of what are referred to as higher risk residential buildings (HRRBs), covering many more aspects of the design, construction and management processes than this paper. However, its analysis of post-construction safety reaches broadly similar conclusions to ours, and its recommendations in this area are consistent with ours while being more narrowly focussed on HRRBs. However, we do differ in some regards.
With regard to our first recommendation, the Hackitt Review Interim Report (Hackitt 2017, p.23) also expressed concern about the effectiveness of Regulation 38, arguing that: ‘there is a need for building control bodies to do more to assure that fire safety information for a building is provided by the person completing the building work to the responsible person for the building in occupation.’ To achieve this, the final report (Hackitt 2018, 36) recommends that fire safety information should be included in a building’s Fire and Emergency File (FEF), and that ‘Government should make the creation, maintenance and handover of relevant information [which includes the FEF] an integral part of the legal responsibilities on Clients, Principal Designers and Principal Contractors.’
Because Hackitt only focussed on HRRBs its proposals are not fully comparable to our second recommendation for better enforcement of the self-regulatory aspect of fire risk assessments. For HRRBs, Hackitt would require dutyholders ‘to provide periodic safety case reviews to demonstrate that building safety is being maintained and that residents are properly engaged’ (Hackitt 2018, 23). However, the Government has not yet decided the scope of any changes in regulation (see Building a Safer Future 2018, 19), and so it is unclear whether self-regulation alone will remain the practice for buildings defined as lower risk. If this is the case, then we believe it is important that a mechanism should be in place to ensure that the fire risk assessment is carried out and made available to the local FRS.
Finally, with regard to our third recommendation, the Hackitt Review Interim Report (Hackitt, 2017, p. 22) suggested a need for a ‘robust, comprehensive, and coherent’ system of accreditation, and ‘for regulation to mandate the use of suitable, qualified professionals who can demonstrate that their skills are up to date’, for fire risk assessments as well as other areas of fire safety. However, again perhaps because of its specific focus on HRRBs, the Hackitt final report did not go any further in specifying how competence of fire risk assessors could be improved.
More broadly, our recommendation for a change in the methodology used in assessing the efficacy of the regulatory system has not really been addressed by Government or the Hackitt review. The Hackitt review itself can be seen as exemplifying our recommended approach because it involved a process which mainly relied on submissions of evidence from key actors in the industry who were aware of the limitations and failings of the current system, as it operated in practice. Taken together, these mainly qualitative accounts provided Hackitt with a compelling picture of inadequacy. However, these failings could just as easily have been revealed – as our research has demonstrated for post-construction regulation – before the Grenfell Tower fire. 
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^1	 	Scotland has separate building regulations from England and Wales. Devolution also led to divergence in 2013 between English and Welsh regulations, although little of substance has so far changed with the main difference being the adoption of a requirement for sprinklers in all new residential premises in Wales – but not in England.
^2	 	The risk of fire is a general hazard in the construction of buildings.  Fire safety during this phase is regulated by the Health and Safety Executive who produce guidance under e.g. the Construction Design and Management Regulations (RRFSO, 2005, s.25(b)(iv); HSE 2015, s.29, 30 and 31).
^3	 	Initiated by the 1981 Command Paper on The Future of Building Control in England & Wales that set out key objectives of ‘maximum self-regulation’ and ‘minimum Government interference’ (HMSO, 1981, p.4).
^4	 	The term, 'single family dwelling' is used to define a residence housing one family or household. This can be, for example, a detached or a semi-detached house, a house in a terrace of houses, an apartment or flat in a block of flats.
^5	 	Scotland has the separate, but similar, Fire (Scotland) Act 2005.
^6	 	Referred to as the ‘duty holder’ in Scotland.
^7	 	In addition to single family buildings, other exceptions include offshore installations, ships, aircraft, locomotives or rolling stock, mine, borehole sites, fields, woods or other agricultural or forestry land (RRFSO, 2005, s.6).
^8	 	Further guidance can, however, be found in e.g. PAS 79 (2012).
^9	 	For more details on the concept of Reasonable Practicability, see (HSE, 2001, 62--3).
^10	 	Government guidance for the responsible person is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/fire-safety-law-and-guidance-documents-for-business
^11	 	Prior to the introduction of national building regulations in the 1960s there were only comprehensive building codes in a few cities (such as London), although most, but not all, buildings constructed during the previous century or so would have conformed to local bye-laws.
^12	 	Interview with a fire risk assessor: No.1: Dec 2014.
^13	 	An Approved Inspector is a self-supervising individual or company appointed under the Building (Approved Inspectors etc.) Regulations 1985 enabling a choice for the consumer requiring the function of building control in England and Wales.  Approved Inspectors can offer their services throughout England and Wales whereas local authority building control can only offer its services in the area administered by the local authority.
^14	 	Interview with a fire risk assessor: No.2: Nov 2014.
^15	 	Interview with a fire risk assessor: No.3: Jan 2015.
^16	 	Interview with a fire risk assessor: No.1: Dec 2014.
^17	 	Interview with a fire risk assessor: No.4: Jan 2015.
^18	 	Interview with a fire risk assessor: No.2: Nov 2014.
^19	 	See: https://www.westsussex.gov.uk/media/2180/fire_risk_assessment_form.pdf
^20	 	Interview with a fire safety adviser: No. 5: Jan 2015.
^21	 	Other registers of fire risk assessors are run by the Institute of Fire Prevention Officers, the Institute of Fire Safety Managers, and the Fire Industry Association.
^22	 	Interview with a fire risk assessor: No.2: Nov 2014.
^23	 	Interview with a fire safety enforcement officer: No.6: Jun 2015.
^24	 	The quantitative data shown combine data available online from the UK Government and data obtained by arrangement with the Chief Fire Officer's Association (CFOA).
^25	 	Guidance documents on IRMP are available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/integrated-risk-management-planning-guidance
^26	 	Family Group 4 is one of the five family groups into which the forty-five FRS in England and Wales are divided for the purpose of comparison and benchmarking. Each group contains FRS that are similar based on key factors such as the mixture of rural and urban, the level of deprivation present, etc. Family Group 4 has the most members and so provides the best opportunity for comparison for the current paper.
